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ABSTRACT
The rapid development of new weapons for the armed forces calls
for changes in the tactics employed and in the organization sizes using
these new weapons; in certain cases completely new organizations must
be developed to employ the new weapon.
A method for the determination of optimal organization size is
presented with particular emphasis on an organization employing a
surface-to-air missile in support of ground combat troops. The
method with appropriate modifications can be applied to any current-
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(listed in order of appearance in text)
X range of initial detection of a target
f probability density function associated with X
n total number of teams or weapons available
m total number of sul divisions of a defended area
S a subdivision of a defended area
t expected number of targets on or over strip S.
T total number of targets expected per unit time
R maximum range at which observation is possible
o
r minimum range at which detection must be made
o
p, probability of detection in time to prepare and launch
a missile at a target
p probability of one missile destroying one target
p . conditional probability of successful launch and flight,
given an initial detection range X
p, . conditional probability that a missile hits and destroys
a target, given a successful launch and flight and initial
detection range X
f degredation factor for strip S.
P probability that a target is destroyed if n missiles
are fired at it
z number of missiles fired at the aircraft designated L in
a raid





The development of new weapons for the armed forces has been moving
ahead at a very rapid rate since the end of the Korean War. The major
emphasis has been in the development of missiles; we now have surface-
to-surface, surface-to-air, air-to-air, and air-to-surface missiles.
Considering both the surface-to-air and the surface-to-surface missiles,
it is known that work has been done in the development of both types cap-
able of being fired by small gro ips of infantrymen against attacking air-
craft or tanks.
The adoption of a missile of the type discussed above creates im-
mediate problems concerned with the employment of the missile and the
organization which is to 'man" the missile. Some of these problems are
stated below.
"How many missiles should be allocated to a Marine Division?"
"How many missiles should be given to each battalion and regiment
of the division?"
"Should a separate organization be formed to employ the missile;
if not, should additional personnel be assigned to an organization to
man the weapon?"
"What kind of an organization should be developed?"
"How should such an organization be employed?"
The purpose of this paper is to develop a method which can be
applied in the determination of the optimal organization size used to
'man' a weapon. Organization size as used in this sense will refer to
squad size which is to be composed of an unknown number of teams. A
team will consist of the personnel necessary to detect and acquire a
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target, and prepare and launch a missile or salvo of missiles.
The problems of command and command control will not be discussed
although methods will be alluded to when required to show the effect of
various fire plans on the effectiveness of organization size.
A hypothetical situation will be considered and by a study of this
situation a method of determining the optimal organization size will be
developed. To simplify the discussion and to illustrate the method,
attention will be focused on a surface-to-air missile; analogus arguments
can be used to discuss surface-to-surface missiles or for that matter,
any weapon which may be developed.
The hypothetical situation will consider an infantry unit which
is in a defensive position and under air attack. Several different organi-
zations are placed within the defensive perimeter of the unit, and for each
of these, the distribution of attacking aircraft is studied and a deter-
mination of the effectiveness of the organization is made. To aid in real-
ism, suitable ammunition restrictions are imposed.
To illustrate some of the problems encountered in reaching a final
decision as to the best organization size, two criteria are used for the
comparison of the effectiveness of the organizations studied.
The first criterion or 'measure of effectiveness 9 used is the per-
cent of attacking aircraft which the organization expects to destroy.
The second criterion consists of the probability function that describes
the probability that the organization will destroy exactly none, one, or
two of a pair of attacking aircraft since the threat to be met is consider-
ed to be comprised of several attacks of two aircraft each.
To illustrate the methodology, a specific example is introduced. The
example is based on the use of three different organizations? six single
2

independently operating teams, three two-team squads, and two three-
team squads. Two plans for the control of firing sequences are con-
sidered for the two- team squads, and just one plan for the three- team
squads.
A total of twelve missiles are considered as the ammunition avail-
able for the defense of a unit against attack by a total of eight enemy
aircraft. The results for this example are presented in tabular form in
tables 1 and 2.
Independent Teams Two Team Squads Three Team Squads
Fire Plan I Fire Plan II
37% 397. 53% 52%
Percent of attacking aircraft destroyed
Table 1.
Probability Independent Two Team Squads Three Team
of Fire Plan Fire Plan
destroying Teams I II Squads
no aircraft .048 .048 .245 .216
one aircraft .432 .343 .470 .528
two aircraft .520 .608 .285 .256
at least one .952 .952 .755 .784
aircraft




The method for determining the entries in the tables is dis-
cussed. In this particular situation the choice of the "best" organiza-
tion should be made after a careful study of the statement of the mission
of the organization, the appropriateness and realism of the assumptions
made
s
and the values in the tables. This final determination car involve





Definitions are an integral part of a problem. Many commonly used
words, even technical words, mean different things to different people.
Certain terms used in this paper are not in common usage and hence must be
defined to avoid misinterpretation of the results.
The term 'team' will be used to refer to the personnel required to
man a weapon. A team consists of those personnel required to detect and
acquire a target, and prepare and launch a missile or salvo of missiles.
The term 'squad' will be used to refer to two or more teams each of
which has control of a missile or group of missiles. As an example of
this definition a machine gun section would be called a squad and a mach-
ine gun squad would be called a team.
'Section' as used herein and applied to aircraft will refer to two
aircraft operating together and flying either side by side or one behind
the other. Let L and R refer to the 'left' and 'right' or 'lead 9 and
'rear' aircraft, as appropriate.
'Group' will refer to two sections of aircraft, the second
section following the first section by a very short time interval.
'Lateral range' is defined as the perpendicular distance from the
weapon to the path of the target, provided that the target continues on











The study of a problem can involve many factors each of which can
take on several different values. They are called variables. To deter-
mine the optimal size organization for a new weapon it is necessary to
consider each factor and determine its importance. Some of these can
be neglected on the basis of apriori considerations whereas others must
be introduced into the model being built.
The variables may be further classified as choice (or fixed) variables,
chance (or random) variables, and nuisance variables. Choice variables
are those which can be fixed or chosen by the investigator. Chance vari-
ables may not be specified precisely by the investigator; however, he may
be able to specify the distribution of such a variable. Nuisance vari-
ables, as the name implies, are variables not of particular interest of
themselves but whose influence must be admitted and accounted for.
The factors to be considered here will be introduced in general terms
and then their application to the particular situation under study will be
discussed. The following list is not all-inclusive, but contains the
major factors considered to be important in this study.
A. Threat . The actual distribution or the expected distri-
bution of targets that will be encountered can sometimes be deduced from
the particular situation being studied. Paths of attack against friendly
positions are usually restricted by terrain configurations and the intel-
ligence available to the enemy. The particular types of distributions
that will be used in this study are discussed in Chapter III, Some of
the components of the distribution of threat are worthy of specific men-
tion. Some are choice variables, others are random variables. They are
(1) Type of target. (A choice variable in this study).
6

The type of target can cause variations in kill probabilities, ranges of
engagement, and tactics employed. In the case of tanks this could be the
type of tank; light, medium, or heavy; the amount of armor plate, etc.
In the particular case of an anti-aircraft missile, this would include a
study of high performance jet aircraft, high performance conventional air-
craft, and helicopters. In certain studies this could include a further
breakdown according to the number of engines on the aircraft.
(2) Altitude of target in relation to the weapon. (This
is fixed at the value least favorable to the defense in this study). This
is a variable that has required consideration by all conventional long
range weapons such as mortars, howitzers, and large caliber guns. In all
of these weapons if corrections are not made for the difference in altitude
between the weapon and the target, the initial rounds will not be 'on tar-
get'. The cost of missiles being far greater than the cost of conventional
high explosive shells and the supply of missiles generally more limited,, it
is necessary to consider all possible factors before launching a missile.
The primary effect of altitude of aircraft in relation
to the weapon is the influence on the range at which observation (detection)
is possible, which in turn is a determining factor in the probability of
detection.
(3) Velocity of target. (This is fixed at the value least
favorable to the defense in this study). It would be reasonable to assume
that the enemy will travel at a speed which is optimal for his mission. This
is a factor determining the amount of time that a target will be within range
of the weapon.
For the case of vehicles it is known that they will
travel at speeds consistent with conditions; i.e., fast if under known
7

observation or exposed to enemy fire, slower if not observable by the
enemy but where high speed could raise dust which would be visible to
the enemy.
Aircraft have a speed which is optimal for the type
of attack being carried out; this is not necessarily the same for all
types of attack.
(4) Number of targets. (This is fixed as a daily or per
attack rate in this study). The number of targets in a single attack or
the number of targets expected to be encountered in a single day is an
important factor in determining the effectiveness of a particular organiza-
tion. A method of dovetailing organization size, number of targets^and
the availability of ammunition must be considered.
(5) Lateral range to the target. (A random variable).
Every weapon has a specific maximum (effective) range. This can be con-
sidered as a circle of proper radius drawn around the location of the
weapon. If the target traverses a diameter of the circle,, then the target
will be in range the maximum amount of time; the lateral range in this case
is zero. As the lateral range increases, the target travels along a chord
of the range circle; hence there will be less time available to intercept
and destroy the target. The degradation of kill probabilities as & result
of increasing lateral range is a most important factor in a study of this
type.
B. Range to the target at initial detection
.
(A random variable).
Let this random variable be X and its associated density function be f„
This is the primary factor which determines the probability of detection




C. Ammunition avai lable, (This is fixed as a daily or per
attack rate in this study). Limitations placed on the amount of ammuni-
tion available can cause changes in the effectiveness of an organization.
Variations in the daily ammunition supply rate can become important in
the overall logistics picture for a new weapon. In a study concerning
logistics this supply rate might best be studied as a random variable.
D. Organization size . (A choice variable.) This is the item
being studied, hence it is the primary variable. It must be varied and
the results of these variations carefully compared.
E. Nuisance variables . There is a certain class of variables
which enter into any study of tactics or organization size and these
variables are difficult, if not impossible, to evaluate. No real yard-
stick has been derived to evaluate them, yet they appear in problems of
this type and can have an important influence on the conclusions reached.
This is particularly true if an experiment is designed to compare the theo-
retical results of a study such as this with actual field trials. Some of
these variables are;
(1) Terrain
(2) Morale of the participating troops
(3) State of training of the participating troops.
Theoretical studies cannot evaluate these variables, they
are mentioned merely because they must somehow be included in any final






A study which is being undertaken may at first appear to admit to no
method of solution because of the complexity introduced by the many vari-
ables. Assumptions are therefore introduced and serve to deliniate and
limit a problem being studied by reducing the complexities in the variables;
in addition, they can serve to reduce the magnitude of the computations re-
quired. The validity of the conclusions is however a function of the reason-
ableness of the assumptions made in the study. The assumptions to be made
in this study will be used to reduce the number of variables that must be
considered by eliminating foolish tactics and illogical actions on the part
of the opposing forces.
The object of this study, as stated in the introduction is to obtain
a method to determine the optimal size of an organization which is to man
a weapon being developed. The general method will focus attention on a
surface-to-air missile. The general method will be illustrated in a later
chapter when assumptions about a specific hypothetical situation will be
set up and a solution obtained.
The assumptions to be made in this study can be grouped into several
logical categories as follows:
A. Assumptions about the organization
B. Assumptions about the threat
C. Miscellaneous assumptions.
2. Assumptions about the organization
Military organizations being compared cannot be properly evaluated
without placement in some kind of a tactical situation such as that in
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which the organization would be called upon to perform its mission.
The general situation in which the organizations being compared would
actually be performing their mission can be specified by the use of assump-
tions. Limitations on the ability of the organizations to perform certain
assignments can be specified, and the necessary time space factors set up
with the use of assumptions.
A. Organizational assumption number one . An infantry unit can
be engaged in several tactical missions, the major ones being offensive com-
bat and defensive combat.
The unit in an attack situatior will normally be
assigned a frontage commensurate with the mission assigned. A situation
such as this involves combat of a very fluid type. It is also hoped that
local air superiority will be maintained by friendly forces so that the
possibility of air attacks by enemy aircraft is extremely unlikely. For
these reasons, the relation of organization size to offensive combat will
not be studied; only situations involving the unit in the defense will be
studied.
B. Organizational assumption number two . Non-nuc.ear warfare
places neighboring units in clcse proximity to each other thus resulting
in mutual support of units and integrated air defense plans As a result
of this, aircraft attacking a specific unit can be taken under fire by
weapons assigned to neighboring units. The resulting increase in over-
all air defense effectiveness in this situation would produce an apparent
increase in effectiveness for the organization which would be lost if the
unit were isolated from its neighbors. Hence, it seems desirable to re-




Assume therefore that maximum dispersion will be employed
in any tactical situation. In this case there is a definite possibility
that there will be undefended corridors between adjacent units. With
sufficient intelligence the enemy will utilize these corridors to pene-
trate any air defense to attack the unit . Since the actual air defense
of the unit will be isolated from that of neighboring units^ the effective-
ness of the new air defense organization can be measured without being in-
fluenced by other similar organizations.
C. Organizational Assumption number three . Some assumptions
must be made concerning the size and nature of the organization which will
employ the new weapon. Size can be described by the total number of teamSj,
n. Organization is the basic variable being examined. For any given value
of n, several different organizations can be assumed and then compared.
D. Organizational Assumption number four . Assume that for any
raid, regardless of size, every team fires one missile or one salvo of
missiles. If this assumption is not made, then there is the problem result-
ing from the fact that the first team to take a target under fire may de-
stroy the target. This problem can complicate a study because there is
a resultant saving in the number of missiles that may be expended against
a single raid and the effectiveness of the organizations being compared
can be materially altered. Gaming can be an effective tool if this assump-
tion is not made and effectiveness of organizations is to be studied.
E. Organizational assumption number five . A realistic restric-
tion must be made on the amount of ammunition available per weapon per day.
This could be a specific number of rounds or a specific number of salvos.
Assume that a single firing by a weapon is a unit and that no distinction
is made between a single missile and a salvo of missiles. Mixed salvos
will not be considered.
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3. Assumptions about the threat .
A tactical situation having been assumed for the organizations to be
compared, it is necessary to present the organization with some sort of a
threat against which it must take action. The enemy does not have unlimit-
ed resources. The production effort of the enemy can limit the threat
facing the organization. Even if the factors of resources and production
effort are not considered, some assumptions about the threat are necessary
so that each different size organization being considered will be forced to
react to the same identical threat and thus a fair comparison of organiza-
tions can be made.
A. Threat assumption number one . An integrated air defense plan
must provide for defense against all types of air attack; this includes
high performance jet aircraft, high performance conventional aircraft^
helicopters, and vertical takeoff aircraft.
It will be assumed that the only threat by aircraft will
be by either propellor driven or jet aircraft. Vertical takeoff air-
craft are at present still in an experimental and development stage.
Helicopters should be considered In a separate study because of their
unique flight characteristics.
It is the opinion of the author that helicopters would
require a different approach for a study of this type.
B. Threat assumption number two . The probability of detection
of aircraft is a function of several variables; one of these is the alti-
tude of the aircraft relative to the surrounding terrain and relative to
the weapon. Aircraft flying just above tree top level are more difficult
to detect than those at higher altitudes where the effects of contrasting
background can increase the chances of detection. It would be possible to
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choose several different altitudes for the aircraft and compute the
effectiveness of each different size organization for each altitude
chosen; however, it is wise to assume that the enemy will adopt his best
tactics and fly at an altitude which will be consistent with his mission
and which will also reduce the probability of detection to a minimum.
Therefore it will suffice to assume a single altitude for all
attacking aircraft in a given situation.
If such an assumption is not made, then the distribution of
the actual altitude of the attacking aircraft must be investigated and
this distribution included in the model.
C. Threat Assumption number three . It has already been noted
that the random variable that describes the range of initial detection of
aircraft by a team, X, plays an important role in this study. The distri-
bution of X can be assumed, empirically estimated, or derived from physical
considerations.
It is here assumed that X is a continuous random variable
with a density function f. It is further assumed that f is the same for
all weapons locations within the area defended by the organization being
examined.
D. Threat Assumption number four . To study the effectiveness
of various size organizations it is necessary to pose a threat of some
kind so that comparisons of the organizations can be made. This can be
a daily threat or a threat for a specific time period. In the case of air-
craft this can be the number of aircraft expected to attack the area in
unit time, the number of attacking sections per unit time, or the total
number of raids per unit time.
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E. Threat Assumption number five . It is possible to consider
attacks by single aircraft; however, aircraft usually attack in sections,
one aircraft affording protection to the other. Based on this it will
be reasonable to assume that aircraft attack only in sections and groups
as defined in the introduction.
F. Threat Assumption number six . Since all targets will not
appear at the same location relative to a weapon, a distribution of in-
coming targets must be assumed. The distribution may be obtained from a
consideration of the tactical situation.
In the case of attacking aircraft, it will be further assum-
ed that the aircraft fly in straight lines when actually conducting an
attack, and that the flight path will be parallel to the front lines.
4. Miscellaneous assumption
The nuisance variables can be discounted in a theoretical study of
this type by assuming identical values for these corresponding to each





The method to be presented here Is completely general and is appli-
cable to weapons of many types. It may be used for studies of weapons
organizations aboard ships provided that the proper minor modifications
are made in some of the variables. Evaluation of criteria may be obtain-
ed for a particular case by using the values for the weapon under consider-
ation and the desired values for the choice variables. This will be illus-
trated with a hypothetical example in Chapter V.
This paper will concentrate on a surface-to-air missile.
As a result, targets will be considered as attacking aircraft; note,
however, that only very minor modifications in some of the words used
would make the paper applicable to other type targets.
First, threat is examined.
The defended area under consideration can be subdivided into strips
parallel to the front lines. Let m be the total number of such strips
and let the strips be designed as S where i - 1,2 8 3. . . . .m. Let S. be
the strip closest to the front lines and S the strip farthest from the
m r
front lines.
The distribution of attackers can now be approximated by a step func-
tion over the strips where the height of the function over the ith strip
is proportional to the probability that a given attacker will attack along
strip S . The number of targets expected to be observed over strip S or
expected to attack along strip S. in a given raid or on a given day can
therefore be designated as t where i l,2,...m and
Z-. t , T = total number of targets expected to attack the area in
A^ 'some 1 time interval.
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It is convenient to express the expected number of targets for
each strip in tabular form.
Strip
m
Expected number of targets t
m
Comparison of strips and targets
Figure 2.
Next, attention is turned to the range of initial detection.
Terrain will determine the maximum range at which observation of
the attackers will first be possible. It has previously been assumed
that this range is the same for all weapon locations; note however, that
in an actual situation the weapons would be placed so that they may best
accomplish their mission. In such a case the detection range could be
different for each weapon location and the probability distribution of
the range of initial detection would be computed separately for each
weapon location.
Detection at the maximum range at which observation is possible will
occur only under the most ideal conditions; however, there is an increase
in the probability of detection as the target approaches the weapon posi-
tion.
Let R be the maximum range at which observation is possible. The
probability that initial detection by a team will take place at range r
s





where the function f is the density function introduced in Threat Assump-
tion number three.
Let r be the minimum range at which detection must be made if there
o
is to be sufficient time to prepare the missile or weapon for firings
launch the missile, and allow it to intercept the target.
Let p be the probability of detection in time^ i.e. 8 prior to r ,
by one team. Then
Pd
s f(x) dx
Weapon behavior is usually incorporated with the range of initial
detection to yield the fundamental quantity p, : the probability that one
missile or one salvo of missiles destroys one target. In addition to the
range of detection, p must reflect the mechanical behavior of the missile
at the launch position and during its flight to the target; further, p
is influenced by guidance characteristics that may not inevitably lead
the missile to intercept the target; finally, the lethality of the war-
head must be considered. Each of these additional factors influencing
p is clearly dependent on the flight path of the missile. In cases where
the target follows a path directly at or over the weapon site*, the depen-
dence can be expressed in terms of the range from the weapon to the target.
If the time from detection to launch is also known, the dependence can be
expressed in terms of the range of initial detection, X. In such cases,
the determination of p, can best be accomplished by combining the ap-
propriate conditional probabilities. Formally this can be written as
shown below:
Let p be the probability of a successful launch and a cess-
ful flight to the target, given that initial detection occured nge
18

Let p, 1 be the probability that the missile hits and destroys the
target, given a successful launch and flight and initial range of detec-
tion, x.
Then, p can be obtained by computing
V*k * J ps/x Ph/x f(x) dx
r
If the target does not follow a path directly at or over the weapon
site p, may be adjusted to account for the effects of lateral range, if
required. There is a relation between range to a target and lateral range
such that the probabilities which are functions of range may be effected
by the lateral range. In the case of an actual missile
s
any changes in
p can be determined by careful analysis of p , s p. . $ and p . The
K S/Xn/XQ
value of p, may increase, decrease, or remain the same. The change in pK K
may be a simple linear function or a more complicated function.
In many cases, a factor called a degradation factor, f say, can be
computed for application to the values of p to be applied to the targets
along strip S.. The factor f will be greater than one if it increases
the probability of a kill, less than one if it decreases the probability
of a kill, and equal to one if it leaves p unaltered. The probability of





Clearly if the number of rounds fired at a target is increased with-
out limit, the probability of kill will approach one.
The degradation factor will influence weapon placement in a defended
area and it appears to be intuitively appealing to locate the weapons in
the strip where the greatest number of targets are expected to attack.
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The problem of obtaining some actual values for the probability of
kill, p,, and the degradation factors, f . , must now be considered. The
ideal solution to this problem is an experiment conducted in a realistic
setting. If the experiment is designed so that in addition to it being
realistic in a tactical sense it is also carefully controlled so that
actual data as to the ranges and times is obtained, then the values of
p, and f„ can be determined as a result of the experiment. It is realizedrk 1
that cost can be a determining factor in the conduct of an experiment and
several 'runs* must usually be made if good data is to be obtained for the
determination of p, and f„. If an experiment cannot be conducted, p,
K 1. K
might be obtained from values of p , and p . which might be estimat-
ed from the engineering requirements for the missile. Pre-production tests
usually made by the manufacturer can also provide a basis for the deter-
mination of p . and p . . Note that tactical realism may be lost if
s / x n/ x
an experiment is not conducted.
Clearly the probability of destroying a target can be increased if
the number of missiles fired at the target is increased. Consider the
relation between the number of missiles fired at a target and the kill
probabilities. Assuming that the firings by the weapons are independent,
the relationship can be developed as follows:
Let 1 - p be the probability that one missile or salvo of missiles
does not destroy the target.
Now (1 - p ) is the probability that n missiles do not destroy a
target.
Then 1 - (1 - p ) is the probability that a target is destroyed
if n missiles are fired at it.
Let 1 - (1 - p.) be designated by P .
20

The basic calculations have now been completed and the different
organization sizes can now be investigated. Since attacks are organized
in sections or groups (Threat Assumption number five) s the analysis will
also be carried out with respect to sections and groups of attacking air-
craft.
For each different size organization being considered, certain computa-
tions must now be made; in addition, for the organizations consisting of
more than single teams it will be necessary to propose several fire plans
so that the best missile allocation against all targets is assured. In
the case of a surface-to-air missile, analysis of the fire plan that is
proposed for an organization which does not consist of individual independ-
ently operating teams will determine how many missiles will be launched at
each aircraft in an attack by a section or group of aircraft.
To describe a fire plan, the aircraft in a section are designated as
L and R corresponding to their location in relation to the weapons.
If the n weapons operate independently, then the missile allocations
will be left to chance. The probability that a specific number of missiles
will be launched at one of the aircraft can be computed. Consider the case
where z missiles are launched at the aircraft designated as L; then n - z
missiles will be launched at the aircraft designated as R, and the missile
allocation in such a case will be designated as z, n - z. There are n + 1
missile allocations possible. The probabilities of the shot allocations
for the case of independent action by the teams can be computed using the
binomial distribution. In this case of independent action it is reasonable
to assume that p - q = 1/2 so that
-2(!) f f ' •• OUS.
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This probability can be computed for every missile allocation possible
in the case of independent team action.
The expected number of aircraft destroyed in an attacking section
for any missile allocation can be computed. Let this be called the ' p fly~
off for a particular shot allocation. Symbolically the payoff is equal
to
oci-p^ ) a-p_,) + i(i-p^)p_ z + m-v*> p * + 2P * ?^-±
and this can be reduced to
P., + P. where z = 1,2,3, ,n.4 n-s
The last two computations can be presented in tabular form as shown
in figure 4.
Allocation of Probability of Payoff
missiles Allocation




I, n - 1
• •
o ar P. + P1 n-1
• •















Allocation probabilities and Payoffs
Figure 3.
To compare the organizations, a measure of effectiveness should be
defined. The use of a measure of effectiveness allows for objective
numerical comparison of the organizations as the factors are varied.
22

Generally several different measures of effectiveness could be conceived
so that the problem of finding the best measure is ever present. Analysis
of the mission of the organization being studied will generally lead to
a preference for one or several of the measures of effectiveness.
As noted in the introduction, two measures of effectiveness suggest
themselves for the study of a surface-to-air missile. The first of these
is the ratio of the total expected number of attackers destroyed to the
total threat per unit time. That is,
E (total targets destroyed )
T
The second measure is the probability function for the number of aircraft
destroyed per section of attacking aircraft, P(w).
In the case of independent team action,
P(w ) = ZL. Pr(shot allocation i) P(w destroyed I shot allocation i)
fee '
If it is now desired to use the first criteria for comparison of
different size organizations, the expected number of aircraft destroyed
for an attacking section can be computed from the relation
E(aircraft killed) = 2. Pr(shot allocation) x Payoff for the allocation
In general, the degradation factor f^ is less than one and serves to
reduce the payoff for some or all shot allocations. If it is neglected,
the expectation computed above will then be the maximum value that can
be achieved for such cases.
In certain cases the location of the weapons must be considered and
the expectations computed separately for each weapon location. These cases
will occur if:
(1) f L is not sufficiently close to one or,




In these cases the possibility of locating the weapons in each strip
and in all combinations of strips must be considered. This will involve
considerable additional computation.
The above computations must be repeated for successive attacking
sections until either the expectations have been computed for the total
threat or the ammunition allotment for the time period has been expended,
whichever is sooner.
The effectiveness is then
Sum for all attacking sections of the expected targets destroyed
.
T
If the second measure of effectiveness is to be used for the compari-
son of the organizations, the probability of destroying none, one, or two
aircraft per attacking section must be calculated. This can be done using
the formula on page 23
,
and would be computed instead of the expected num-
ber of aircraft destroyed.
The computational procedures iiscussed herein would be applied to
each different organization being considered and the results presented in
tabular form for analysis and possible decision as to the 'best" organiza-
tion size. This final decision can involve utility theory and/or decision
theory.
It should be remembered that any decision made at this point of the
study will reflect the assumptions made in the study. The results thus
far can be more carefully analyzed before a decision is reached if certain
of the assumptions are either relaxed or completely eliminated. Clearly in
this study the removal of ammunition restrictions, changes in the assumptions
about the method of attack to be used by the enemy, and removal of the
isolation of the organization assumption will result in changes of the
24

effectiveness of the organizations.
Experiments might be conducted to determine if the assumptions made
are indeed realistic; in addition, an experiment could provide realistic
values for some of the choice variables.
Analysis of the assumptions is now a logical next step before any






The computations involved in the general method can now be illustrat-
ed with a specific hypothetical example. The example will illustrate the
use of fire plans and their interaction with organization size. Some
specific values for the choice variables will be required in this example.
The hypothetical example will consider an availability of six weapons
( n = 6), a threat of eight aircraft per day (T - 8), and an ammunition
availability of twelve missiles per day.
Let the defended area be divided into three strips of equal width.
The strips will be designated S , S_, and S .
Assume that the distribution of attacking aircraft is as shown in fig-
ure 4. This is an approximation to a triangular distribution such as might
be encountered if the personnel in the defended area are actively engaged by
enemy troops. Exchanges of fire would indicate the front lines to the





The expected number of targets in each strip can be computed.















To illustrate the computation of p , let the density function associa-
ted with the range of detection be f(>0-e . In addition 8 let engineering
requirements be such that p^ , and p . are independent of range of
initial detection and are equal to .95 and .60 respectively. Let the
range at which detection is first possible, R
,
be approximately two miles,
i.e. 3400 yards; let the range at which detection must be made if there is
to be sufficient time to launch a missile be 300 yards. The probability
of kill, p , is then computed as follows:
Pk
=
I P s/x Ph/x f(x) dx
5 / (.95)060) e X dx
= .40
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Values of P for p, = .40
n k
Table 4.
Three organization sizes will be considered: independent teams,
two team squads, and three team squads. Hypothetical fire plans will be
introduced as appropriate.
2. First Criterion
The first measure of effectiveness of the organizations computed for
this example will be the expected percentage of aircraft destroyed per day,
This is the first criterion of the general method.
A. Independent teams . This organization expends six missiles
against each attacking section so that only two sections of aircraft can
be taken under fire. The expected number of aircraft destroyed in the
second attacking section will be the same as for the first section.
Note that in attacks by groups of aircraft the results will
not change since a maximum of four aircraft will be taken under fire,,
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Independent action by the six teams which are all placed
in S allows for seven different missile allocations to an attacking
section. If the teams do act independently, then each is free to choose
as its target either the aircraft designated as L or the aircraft designat
ed as R, and one choice is as likely as the other. If the binomial dis-
tribution is now used to compute the probability of missile allocations,
p = (1 - p) = 1/2. The computation is illustrated for 5? ~ 4 a^d hence
n - Z. =2.
table 5.
<1> (1 - p) becomes
61 a\ 6
4! 2\ X *
15
64
The payoff in the 4,2 allocation is
P. + P = .87 + .64
= 1.51













The expected number of aircraft destroyed can now be
computed for an attacking section of aircraft. This expectation is 1.47
aircraft.
The effectiveness of this organization is
2.94 - .37
8
B. Two Team Squads . The six teams are now formed into three
squads of two teams each. Fire plans can now be introduced since the teams
in a squad can act together to improve the overall effectiveness of the
organization.
(1) Fire Plan I . Let the teams of each squad be designated
as team #1 and team #2. Let the attack policy be 'all teams #1 will
attack the right aircraft and all teams #2 attack the left aircraft".
This will ensure that 3 missiles are launched at each aircraft. Using
the ammunition restriction imposed for this example, the disadvantage
that only four aircraft can be taken under fire is readily apparent.
The missile allocation against a section will be
3,3 and the expected number of aircraft destroyed will be 1.56.
The second attacking section will receive the same
missile allocation and the expected number of aircraft destroyed will be
the same.
The maximum expected number of aircraft that are de-
stroyed if the enemy attacks in sections will be 3.12 aircraft and this
yields an effectiveness for this organization and fire plan of .39.
«
In the case of attacks by groups of aircraft, the
results will be the same as for attacks by sections since only the first
section in each group will be taken under fire.
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(2) Fire Plan II . Let this be, "Squads one and two
are to take the first section of aircraft under fire s squad three is to
take the second section under fire, squad one the third section, and
squads two and three the fourth section. Fire plan I is to remain in
effect to determine missile allocations". This fire plan will ensure
that all eight aircraft are taken under fire independent of the method
of attack used by the enemy.
To determine the effectiveness of this organization
and this fire plan, each attacking section must be considered separately.
The first section attacking the defensive area will be
taken under fire by squads one and two with two rounds being expended
against each aircraft. The maximum expectation in aircraft destroyed
will be 1.32.
The second attacking section will be taken under fire
by squad three and only one round will be expended against each aircraft.
The maximum expectation in aircraft destroyed will be .80.
Note that in the case of attack by a group of air-
craft both sections will be taken under attack exactly as if the attack
were made by two separate sections. The maximum total expectation for
the first group or the first two sections will be 2.12 aircraft.
The third section will be taken under fire by squad
one with one missile launched at each aircraft and a maximum expected .80
aircraft destroyed.
The fourth section will be taken under fire by squads
two and three with two missiles launched at each aircraft and a maximum
expected 1.32 aircraft destroyed.
The total number of aircraft expected to be destroyed
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for attack by all eight aircraft is seen to be 4.24 for a maximum effective-
ness of .53.
Clearly for an organization consisting of two team squads a maximum
effectiveness can be obtained by the use of fire plan II.
c « Three Team Squads . The original six teams can now be formed
into two squads of three teams each; only one simple fire plan will be used.
'Let the first squad take the first and third attacking sections under fire;
the second squad, the second and fourth sections. To ensure that the best
missile allocation is used let the first team in each squad take the left
aircraft under fire, the second team the right aircraft, and let the third
team choose either aircraft'.
The fire plan used by this organization ensures a missile
allocation of 2,1 against each section and will result in the same effective-
ness regardless of the method of attack used by the enemy. The expectation
for each section will be 1.04 aircraft destroyed so that the maximum
number of aircraft expected to be destroyed in any one day will be 4.16 for
a maximum effectiveness of .52.
The results for the three organization in this example can
be summarized in tabular form as shown in table 6.
Independent Teams Two Team Squads Three Team Squads
37%
Fire Fire






If a determination must be made as to the best organization the
choice would be either two team squads and fire Plan II, or three team
squads. The problem in this case would be the difficult one of determin-
ing the worth of a one percent difference in the effectiveness of organiza-
tions.
3. Second Criterion
The mission of the organizations studied in this example can be
stated as 'to provide an air defense capability to the defended area 8 .
This mission must be kept in mind as conclusions are reached. Clearly,
an air defense capability can be provided without actually destroying the
attacking aircraft. If the enemy air attacks are materially reduced, then
the organization could be said to be accomplishing its mission. The re-
duction in the number of attacks could be measured by the 'danger" presented
to aircraft attacking the defended area. This "danger* presented can be
measured by the probability of destroying exactly none, one, or two air-
craft.
This utilizes the second measure of effectiveness of the general meth-
odology. These probabilities can be computed utilizing the relations
Pr (0 aircraft destroyed) =c Pf (shot allocation) x
Pr (neither killed |allocation)
Pr (1 aircraft destroyed) = ^. Pr (shot allocation) x
Pr (one killed allocation)
Pr (2 aircraft destroyed) - £ Pr (shot allocation) x
Pr (both killedlallocation)
The results of this computation considering both organization size
and fire plans in this example are summarized in table 7.
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Prob. of Independent Two Team Squads Three Team Squads
Destroying Teams Fire
Plan I Plan II
No Aircraft .048 .048 .245 .216
One Aircraft .432 .343 .470 .528
Two Aircraft .520 .608 ,285 .256




Careful analysis of the assumptions made in the study would now be
required. Some of the assumptions could be varied or eliminated and the
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